50 years of Japan-U.S. Alliance

Japan Press Weekly

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50 years of Japan-U.S. Alliance
Illusion of ‘equality’ - Part II

Young Nakasone mutters disgust

The original Japan-U.S. security treaty was signed on September 8, 1951, the same day the Treaty of Peace with Japan (San Francisco Treaty) was signed.

Non-Commissioned Officers Club

Even though the security treaty would have significant influence on Japan’s sovereignty, the date and time for the signing were not given to Japanese government officials until the last minute. A little past 11 p.m. on September 7, they were finally told that the signing ceremony would take place at 5 p.m. the next day at the U.S. Army sixth garrison in the suburb of San Francisco. Furthermore, the venue for the signing was a room in a non-commissioned officers club.

“If a different city or at least a different date for the signing were set to make it look like that Japan and the U.S. had negotiations on an equal footing before signing, it would be much easier for Japanese citizens to accept (the security treaty),” muttered Tomabechi Gizo, the ambassador plenipotentiary of the peace treaty, at the signing of the security treaty (“Diplomatic History of Japan ? San Francisco Peace Treaty”).

The signatories on the U.S. side were the same as the ones for the peace treaty, Acheson and three other officials. But Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru was the only Japanese signatory. “Only Prime Minister Yoshida signed for Japan, as the other Japanese plenipotentiaries did not know of its contents,” said the U.S. State Department’s Intelligence Report (January 22 1957).

Whole nation can be used as bases

The former security treaty stated in its Article 1, “Japan grants, and the United States of America accepts, the right, upon the coming into force of the Treaty of Peace and of this Treaty, to dispose United States land, air, and sea forces in and about Japan,” giving the U.S. a right to install as many bases as it wants anywhere in Japan. The same article also stated that the U.S. forces would “put down large-scale internal riots and disturbances in Japan.”

The San Francisco Treaty requires occupation forces to be withdrawn from Japan no later than 90 days after the coming into force of the treaty unless other arrangements are made. However, it was agreed by notes exchanged between Minister of State Okazaki Katsuo and Special Representative of the President Dean Rusk on February 28, 1952 that the U.S. will be allowed to continue using its bases in Japan without a new arrangement.

At that time, the Japanese government did not agree on the U.S. continued use of 50 military bases. Today, some of them, including the U.S. Naval Sasebo Base (Nagasaki Pref.) and the Hiro Ammunition Depot (Hiroshima Depot) are still occupied by the U.S. forces.

Special privileges

The Administrative Arrangement, giving the U.S. forces in Japan special privileges, gave an even more humiliating status to Japan than the security treaty.

It required Japan to pay for “procurement by the United States of transportation and other requisite services and supplies in Japan” as well as compensation for landowners. The U.S. forces were exempted from paying customs and other taxes as well as charges for the use of civilian airports, seaports, and expressways. Moreover, Article 17 gave the U.S. “the right to exercise within Japan exclusive jurisdiction over all offenses which may be committed in Japan by members of the United States armed forces.” It gave the U.S. the same privileges as during the occupation period.

Those exclusive rights remain in the current Japan-U.S. Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA). The extraterritorial rights given to the U.S. forces were extremely generous compared to Germany, which was also defeated in the war.

Feared of citizens’ criticism, the Japanese government did not make the treaty public until February 1952, three months after its ratification. It did not even hold Diet discussions. After making it public, it faced strong criticism both inside and outside the Diet.

One day, a young parliamentarian of the Liberal Party visited a room of the treaties bureau head in the Foreign Ministry. The head explained to him the process of negotiations they went through for the conclusion of the Administrative Arrangement.

“I see, so this arrangement is to colonize Japan,” said the parliamentarian and left the room. The treaties bureau head dropped his shoulders in disappointment, wrote Nishimura Kumao. (“Japanese Diplomatic Records, reports related to conclusion of peace treaty VIII”) This parliamentarian was Nakasone Yasuhiro, who later became the prime minister.

(To be continued)