50 years of Japan-U.S. Alliance

Japan Press Weekly

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50 years of Japan-U.S. Alliance
Illusion of ‘equality’ - Part VI

Bringing nuclear weapons into Japan is absolute requirement

“Consultation is at the very heart of the revision of the (Japan-U.S. Security) treaty.”

This remark was made by Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs Yamada Hisanari in a meeting with U.S. Ambassador to Japan Douglas MacArthur II on December 13 1959, just before the Japanese and the U.S. governments signed the revised Japan-U.S. Security Treaty.

Why “the very heart”? Yamada stated, “If public impression in Japan is created that the U.S. would, without Japanese consent, introduce nuclear weapons into Japan or use the U.S. forces and bases in Japan to initiate combat operations in hostilities in which the U.S. but not Japan are engaged, there will be immediate defections in the Liberal Democratic Party, collapse of the Kishi government, and the treaty will be defeated in the Diet on this issue. (Telegram from MacArthur to the U.S. State of Department dated December 14, 1959)”

Government propaganda about bringing nuclear weapons into Japan

The prior consultation proposed by Prime Minister Kishi Nobusuke was the most important tool to give the illusion that the amendment to the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty made the Japan-U.S. relation equal.

The subject of prior consultation concerned major changes in the deployment of the U.S. forces in Japan, major changes in their equipment, and the use of facilities and areas in Japan as bases for military combat operations.

This was confirmed in notes of exchange between Prime Minister Kishi and U.S. Secretary of State Christian A. Herter.

The Foreign Affairs Ministry booklet entitled, “New Japan-U.S. Mutual Cooperation-The Security Treaty”, states that the Japanese government made efforts to prevent the U.S. from bringing nuclear weapons into Japan without notice and respond to the Japanese people’s anxiety about the possibility that Japan would involve itself in wars against its national interest. This government propaganda was used to mislead the public.

U.S. refuses to accept Japan’s veto power

As for its policy to bring nuclear weapons into Japan, the U.S. government stated, “We must be free to introduce atomic weapons into the countries where our forces are stationed and reasonably certain that no special ban will be placed on their use in the event of hostilities (United States Overseas Military Bases, Report to the President by Frank Nash, December, 1957).”

In the Report of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (dated September 10, 1958) which gave the conditions to hold negotiations for a revision of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty, the U.S. forces stated that bringing nuclear weapons into Japan “remains a highly desirable military objective toward which to work.”

The U.S. forces, however, considered that “the ‘atom bomb’ in any context still remains in Japan a matter of the utmost emotional intensity” and decided that “it would be unrealistic to expect to obtain Japanese agreement for the introduction of nuclear components into Japan” officially. Therefore, the U.S. forces changed its aim “to seek to maintain the status quo with respect to weapons in Japan.”

U.S. military ships and aircraft carrying nuclear weapons have repeatedly visited Japan since the 1950s. For the U.S. forces, maintaining the situation that enabled them to bring nuclear weapons freely into Japan without Japan’s agreement was the absolute condition required when revising the Japan-U.S. military treaty.

Regarding the use of U.S. bases in Japan for combat operations, the U.S. forces stuck to the position that “there must be no obligation, implied or explicit, to grant Japan a veto power over the employment of U.S. forces (the report of the Joint Chiefs of Staff).” The free use of U.S. military bases in Japan was set as the absolute requirement.

(To be continued)