February 19,2010
“At that time I realized the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty should be on an equal footing.”
This is how Kishi Nobusuke described what he felt when he saw the U.S. rejection of Foreign Minister Shigemitsu Mamoru’s call for withdrawal of all U.S. forces from Japan in August 1955 (“Record of remarks by Kishi Nobusuke”, Hara Yoshihisa).
However, what he said as prime minister at a meeting with U.S. Presient Eisenhower on June 19, 1957 was totally different.
As the U.S. “Memorandum of a Conversation” stated, Kishi said, “Mr. Shigemitsu asked that the Security Treaty be revised into an ‘equal’ agreement because he believed that Japan was in a ‘subjugated’ position under the Treaty. I do not share that feeling.”
According to a telegram on April 13, 1957 sent by the U.S. Embassy to the Department of State, Kishi made the following proposals to Ambassador MacArthur: 1) the United States not utilize its armed forces stationed in Japan and other Far Eastern areas unless overt aggression occurred in those areas; 2) amendment of the provision for expiration of the treaty so that it would be in effect for 5 years from date of revision and terminable thereafter upon 1 year’s notice by either party; 3) a continuing buildup of Japanese defense forces accompanied by withdrawal of U.S. forces to the maximum possible extent, including a complete pullout of ground forces and the release of some U.S. bases to Japan.
Furthermore, in the meeting with Eisenhower, Kishi said, “[U]nder the treaty, the employment of your forces in Japan is subject to the unilateral determination of the United States; we would like to have this subject to consultation with the Japanese side.” This proposal bore fruit in the Japan-U.S. joint communiqué issued on June 21, 1957: “It was agreed to establish an intergovernmental committee to study problems arising in relation to the Security Treaty including consultation, whenever practicable, regarding the disposition and employment in Japan by the United States of its forces.”
In short, Kishi’s intention was to produce “equality” by setting rules such as the consultation framework and one-year notification for termination of the treaty, while acknowledging the stationing of U.S. Army, Navy, and Air Force in Japan excluding ground combat troops.
However, this was not enough for the U.S. side.
In negotiations for the revision of the Security Treaty which started in October 1958, the U.S. side demanded the following: (1) Treaty should provide right for US to station its forces in Japan; (2) Administrative Agreement should remain unchanged; (3) Joint consultation should take place only during emergency not only with respect to operational use of bases but also with regard to deployment of US forces and equipment into Japan; (4) Treaty should provide the right for US use of its forces in Japan in the event of Communist aggression directed against another free Asian nation wherein Japan’s safety is threatened (Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in Japan September 30, 1958).
Those were all realized under the current security treaty structure by bilateral secret agreement, which will be a focus in this series later.
(To be continued)
This is how Kishi Nobusuke described what he felt when he saw the U.S. rejection of Foreign Minister Shigemitsu Mamoru’s call for withdrawal of all U.S. forces from Japan in August 1955 (“Record of remarks by Kishi Nobusuke”, Hara Yoshihisa).
However, what he said as prime minister at a meeting with U.S. Presient Eisenhower on June 19, 1957 was totally different.
As the U.S. “Memorandum of a Conversation” stated, Kishi said, “Mr. Shigemitsu asked that the Security Treaty be revised into an ‘equal’ agreement because he believed that Japan was in a ‘subjugated’ position under the Treaty. I do not share that feeling.”
According to a telegram on April 13, 1957 sent by the U.S. Embassy to the Department of State, Kishi made the following proposals to Ambassador MacArthur: 1) the United States not utilize its armed forces stationed in Japan and other Far Eastern areas unless overt aggression occurred in those areas; 2) amendment of the provision for expiration of the treaty so that it would be in effect for 5 years from date of revision and terminable thereafter upon 1 year’s notice by either party; 3) a continuing buildup of Japanese defense forces accompanied by withdrawal of U.S. forces to the maximum possible extent, including a complete pullout of ground forces and the release of some U.S. bases to Japan.
Furthermore, in the meeting with Eisenhower, Kishi said, “[U]nder the treaty, the employment of your forces in Japan is subject to the unilateral determination of the United States; we would like to have this subject to consultation with the Japanese side.” This proposal bore fruit in the Japan-U.S. joint communiqué issued on June 21, 1957: “It was agreed to establish an intergovernmental committee to study problems arising in relation to the Security Treaty including consultation, whenever practicable, regarding the disposition and employment in Japan by the United States of its forces.”
In short, Kishi’s intention was to produce “equality” by setting rules such as the consultation framework and one-year notification for termination of the treaty, while acknowledging the stationing of U.S. Army, Navy, and Air Force in Japan excluding ground combat troops.
However, this was not enough for the U.S. side.
In negotiations for the revision of the Security Treaty which started in October 1958, the U.S. side demanded the following: (1) Treaty should provide right for US to station its forces in Japan; (2) Administrative Agreement should remain unchanged; (3) Joint consultation should take place only during emergency not only with respect to operational use of bases but also with regard to deployment of US forces and equipment into Japan; (4) Treaty should provide the right for US use of its forces in Japan in the event of Communist aggression directed against another free Asian nation wherein Japan’s safety is threatened (Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in Japan September 30, 1958).
Those were all realized under the current security treaty structure by bilateral secret agreement, which will be a focus in this series later.
(To be continued)
