May 07,2010
Okinawa was returned to Japan on May 15, 1972, thanks to the struggles carried out by mainland Japanese and Okinawans. However, for the U.S. forces, the special privileges they had enjoyed during their occupation on Okinawa were never taken away even after its restoration.
Storage of nuclear weapons in emergency
The U.S. National Security Study Memorandum 5 (NSSM 5), written on April 28, 1969 amid the bilateral negotiation for Okinawa’s return, states, “Okinawa houses the most important US military base system in the Western Pacific, capable of performing a wide variety of functions. Its value is enhanced by the absence of any legal restriction on American free access to or use of the bases; which permits storage of nuclear weapons and the launching of military combat operations directly from these bases.”
U.S. military officials strongly opposed to a loss of the right to store nuclear weapons in Okinawa. As a result, behind their joint declaration on Okinawa’s restoration on November 21, 1969, President Richard Nixon and Prime Minister Sato Eisaku secretly made an agreement that “[T]he United States Government also requires the standby retention and activation in time of great emergency of existing nuclear storage locations in Okinawa, Kadena, Naha, Henoko and Nike Hercules units.”
Extraordinary proposal
In addition to that, another major concern the U.S. forces had right before Okinawa’s return to Japan was whether or not they have to give up their free use of bases in Okinawa, which were built on land they forcibly took away from residents after the end of WW II.
Created on May 28, 1969, the National Security Decision Memorandum 13 (NSDM 13) stressed: “Our desire for maximum free conventional use of the military bases, particularly with respect to Korea, Taiwan and Vietnam;” “Our desire to retain nuclear weapons on Okinawa, but indicating that the President is prepared to consider, at the final stage of negotiation, the withdrawal of the weapons while retaining emergency storage and transit rights, if other elements of the Okinawan agreement are satisfactory.”
What the document suggests here is that the U.S. military was trying to maintain its “maximum free” use of U.S. bases in Okinawa in exchange for a temporary withdrawal of nuclear weapons from the southern islands.
The U.S. made a secret agreement with Japan to exclude dispatching of its forces from mainland Japan to battle fields from subjects to prior consultation. However, this condition was still not enough for U.S. military officials compared with that of Okinawa, from which they could freely send their forces to Vietnam anytime they wanted.
The NSSM 5 therefore made an extraordinary proposal: U.S. forces’ free use of their bases in Okinawa would also be applied to the bases in mainland Japan on the occasion of Okinawa’s restoration.
Today, U.S. bases in Japan have become sortie bases for the U.S. forces to conduct global wars with the absence of the Japanese government’s input over the situation.
(To be continued)
Storage of nuclear weapons in emergency
The U.S. National Security Study Memorandum 5 (NSSM 5), written on April 28, 1969 amid the bilateral negotiation for Okinawa’s return, states, “Okinawa houses the most important US military base system in the Western Pacific, capable of performing a wide variety of functions. Its value is enhanced by the absence of any legal restriction on American free access to or use of the bases; which permits storage of nuclear weapons and the launching of military combat operations directly from these bases.”
U.S. military officials strongly opposed to a loss of the right to store nuclear weapons in Okinawa. As a result, behind their joint declaration on Okinawa’s restoration on November 21, 1969, President Richard Nixon and Prime Minister Sato Eisaku secretly made an agreement that “[T]he United States Government also requires the standby retention and activation in time of great emergency of existing nuclear storage locations in Okinawa, Kadena, Naha, Henoko and Nike Hercules units.”
Extraordinary proposal
In addition to that, another major concern the U.S. forces had right before Okinawa’s return to Japan was whether or not they have to give up their free use of bases in Okinawa, which were built on land they forcibly took away from residents after the end of WW II.
Created on May 28, 1969, the National Security Decision Memorandum 13 (NSDM 13) stressed: “Our desire for maximum free conventional use of the military bases, particularly with respect to Korea, Taiwan and Vietnam;” “Our desire to retain nuclear weapons on Okinawa, but indicating that the President is prepared to consider, at the final stage of negotiation, the withdrawal of the weapons while retaining emergency storage and transit rights, if other elements of the Okinawan agreement are satisfactory.”
What the document suggests here is that the U.S. military was trying to maintain its “maximum free” use of U.S. bases in Okinawa in exchange for a temporary withdrawal of nuclear weapons from the southern islands.
The U.S. made a secret agreement with Japan to exclude dispatching of its forces from mainland Japan to battle fields from subjects to prior consultation. However, this condition was still not enough for U.S. military officials compared with that of Okinawa, from which they could freely send their forces to Vietnam anytime they wanted.
The NSSM 5 therefore made an extraordinary proposal: U.S. forces’ free use of their bases in Okinawa would also be applied to the bases in mainland Japan on the occasion of Okinawa’s restoration.
Today, U.S. bases in Japan have become sortie bases for the U.S. forces to conduct global wars with the absence of the Japanese government’s input over the situation.
(To be continued)
