October 9, 2011
US strategy influence on Japan’s nuclear energy policy (Part 8)
In January 1956, Shoriki Matsutaro, right after taking office as the first president of the Atomic Energy Commission, announced a plan to build a nuclear reactor and conclude a power agreement with the United States within five years. This was intended to show his political leadership ability and realize his ambition to become a prime minister.
However, being desperate for making some achievement in nuclear power generation, Shoriki could not wait for the U.S. to complete its development of nuclear reactors fueled with enriched uranium. Therefore, only in a few months after the announcement of the plan, he changed the policy and started to work for the introduction into Japan of Calder Hall reactors (a natural uranium graphite reactor) developed by the United Kingdom.
Of course this move upset the United States, which immediately staged a major comeback.
A confidential document, written by the Japanese foreign ministry in February 1957, states, “Being cautious that Japan might sign a power agreement with the U.K., purchase British power reactors and join the U.K.’s camp in nuclear power generation, the United States advertised among Japanese authorities advantages of its enriched uranium-power reactor overtly and covertly.”
In October 1956, the government sent a research group to the U.K. in order to examine the possible import of the Calder Hall reactor to Japan. The group was led by Ishikawa Ichiro, Atomic Energy Commission member and chairman of the Japan Federation of Economic Organizations (Keidanren).
According to the foreign ministry’s document, the U.S. invited Ishikawa to the United States after the U.K. tour, showed him the superiority of its power reactor, and negotiated with him on a bilateral agreement which would enable Japan to purchase U.S. power reactors.
The U.K. research group in January 1957 submitted to the Atomic Energy Commission a report which concluded that the U.K. Calder Hall reactor can be one of the options available for Japan to use domestically.
Meanwhile, Ishikawa and his colleagues also issued a report on their visit to the U.S., expressing that the knowledge and experience the U.S. has on atomic power “lead the world.” It asserted that while it is too early to import the U.S.-developed reactor, it will likely be introduced into Japan in the near future.
The government ended up introducing a Calder Hall reactor only into Japan’s first commercial nuclear power plant in Tokai Village in Ibaraki Prefecture. All the other reactors built since then were U.S.-developed light water reactors fueled with enriched uranium. The Calder Hall reactor in Tokai Village was shut down in 1998.
Although Shoriki tried to reach the very top of Japan’s political arena by steering the nation’s atomic energy policy, he could not fight against the power of the United States.
(To be continued)
In January 1956, Shoriki Matsutaro, right after taking office as the first president of the Atomic Energy Commission, announced a plan to build a nuclear reactor and conclude a power agreement with the United States within five years. This was intended to show his political leadership ability and realize his ambition to become a prime minister.
However, being desperate for making some achievement in nuclear power generation, Shoriki could not wait for the U.S. to complete its development of nuclear reactors fueled with enriched uranium. Therefore, only in a few months after the announcement of the plan, he changed the policy and started to work for the introduction into Japan of Calder Hall reactors (a natural uranium graphite reactor) developed by the United Kingdom.
Of course this move upset the United States, which immediately staged a major comeback.
A confidential document, written by the Japanese foreign ministry in February 1957, states, “Being cautious that Japan might sign a power agreement with the U.K., purchase British power reactors and join the U.K.’s camp in nuclear power generation, the United States advertised among Japanese authorities advantages of its enriched uranium-power reactor overtly and covertly.”
In October 1956, the government sent a research group to the U.K. in order to examine the possible import of the Calder Hall reactor to Japan. The group was led by Ishikawa Ichiro, Atomic Energy Commission member and chairman of the Japan Federation of Economic Organizations (Keidanren).
According to the foreign ministry’s document, the U.S. invited Ishikawa to the United States after the U.K. tour, showed him the superiority of its power reactor, and negotiated with him on a bilateral agreement which would enable Japan to purchase U.S. power reactors.
The U.K. research group in January 1957 submitted to the Atomic Energy Commission a report which concluded that the U.K. Calder Hall reactor can be one of the options available for Japan to use domestically.
Meanwhile, Ishikawa and his colleagues also issued a report on their visit to the U.S., expressing that the knowledge and experience the U.S. has on atomic power “lead the world.” It asserted that while it is too early to import the U.S.-developed reactor, it will likely be introduced into Japan in the near future.
The government ended up introducing a Calder Hall reactor only into Japan’s first commercial nuclear power plant in Tokai Village in Ibaraki Prefecture. All the other reactors built since then were U.S.-developed light water reactors fueled with enriched uranium. The Calder Hall reactor in Tokai Village was shut down in 1998.
Although Shoriki tried to reach the very top of Japan’s political arena by steering the nation’s atomic energy policy, he could not fight against the power of the United States.
(To be continued)
