December 20, 2010
The National Defense Program Guidelines, which the cabinet adopted on December 17, has moved away from the “basic defense concept” maintained by successive governments and has introduced the concept of “dynamic defense force.” It has made clear the fact that the Democratic Party of Japan’s definition of defense is more dangerous than that of the Liberal Democratic Party government.
More dangerous than LDP's position
The National Defense Program Guidelines, which the cabinet adopted on December 17, has moved away from the “basic defense concept” maintained by successive governments and has introduced the concept of “dynamic defense force.” It has made clear the fact that the Democratic Party of Japan’s definition of defense is more dangerous than that of the Liberal Democratic Party government.
“We shall do what the bureaucrat-led past LDP governments were unable to do,” Nagashima Akihisa, former DPJ parliamentary secretary on defense, proclaimed in regard to the significance of the DPJ version of the defense guideline.
The “basic defense concept” first appeared in the first defense guideline adopted in October 1976. This means that whatever takes place in the international situation, Japan should possess the necessary minimum of military forces throughout Japan, allegedly so as to not produce a “power vacuum” in regions surrounding Japan.
In the 1976 defense guideline, then Defense Agency Secretary General Sakata Michita explained that the “basic defense concept” came from the need to get away from the conventional thinking of the Cold War as between East and West and to assume the need for a stable regional balance among states rather than the need to counter specific threats.
Responding militarily to any military provocation
The new defense guideline bares its posture of hostility towards Japan’s neighboring countries. It for the first time sees China’s military buildup as a matter of concern to the international community.
Defense Minister Kitazawa Toshimi in a statement he made on December 17 said, “Dynamic deterrence by which a state shows its national intention and high defense capabilities is important, not by static deterrence of deterring (enemies) with the presence of defense.”
In response to the threat of large-scale military forces, including nuclear capabilities, of China, Russia, and North Korea, the new defense guideline underlines Japan’s intention to carry out activities that will openly show hostility towards them.
This means that the Japanese government is prepared to confront those which it regards as a threat or concern with a military response.
Qualitative enhancement
One member of a governmental panel on “security and defense capability in a new era”, which provided the basis for the conventional guideline in its report released in August, said, “The ‘basic defense concept’ used to be like a solid mass of goalkeepers in front of a soccer goal. We can no longer do that. From now on, Japan should select and enhance defense capabilities to provide state-of-the-art quality.”
Bolstering the Self-Defense Forces in the Nansei Islands, centering on Okinawa, is a concrete example of the enhancement.
The defense guideline states that Ground SDF units will be deployed to Yonaguni Island, which is a short distance from Taiwan. In order to put a brake on Chinese submarine activities in the East China Sea, the guideline states its plan to increase the number of Maritime SDF submarines for the first time in 30 years from 16 to 22. The guideline also calls for the deployment of additional Air SDF units and early-warning aircraft. These moves provide proof of the guideline’s aim to greatly increase land-sea-and-air defense capabilities.
It is probable that Japan’s strengthening of military capabilities under the guideline will increase the likelihood of provoking serious conflict. Amid the increasing tension between Japan and China due to the issue of territorial rights over the Senkaku Islands, the guideline may be construed as a message that Japan will counter China with its military threat and will have a negative impact on Japan-China relations. The guideline would also escalate military tensions between the two countries.
Furthermore, the guideline will impose further military burdens on Okinawan people. It states that the government will implement the plan to realign the U.S forces in Japan, which includes the plan to relocate the U.S. Marine Corps Futenma Air Station (Ginowan City) to the Henoko district in Nago City of Okinawa. This shows that the guideline intends to perpetuate the U.S. bases burden on Okinawans and turn Okinawa’s Sakishima Islands, where there has been no military base in the past, into a new military stronghold.
The SDF frequently visited the Sakishima Islands under the pretext of carrying out emergency drills, and the SDF’s use of civil airports in this area is increasing. Concerns are increasing over the SDF increase in mobilizations among the local people.
Transformation of SDF
The “dynamic defense force” policy includes the dispatch of the SDF abroad in addition to measures dealing with China and North Korea.
Since the 1990s, the former Liberal Democratic Party government accelerated the dispatch of SDF units abroad as well as the SDF integration with the U.S. forces, strengthened the SDF units deployed in the Kyushu region, and advanced the missile defense network. The policy shift toward a “dynamic defense force” was actually progressing all along.
Nagashima said, “Now that the Democratic Party of Japan has taken power, we should change our policy (from the ‘basic defense concept’) to ‘dynamic defense force’ in order to make use of the equipment and capabilities we already possess.” What Nagashima is saying is that the DPJ has officially declared the transformation of the SDF and wants to freely carry out any plans, including the revision of the five PKO principles and the Three Principles on Arms Exports, which the LDP government could not do despite their eagerness to do so. Then, what was the real intent of the political power change?
- Akahata, December 20, 2010
The National Defense Program Guidelines, which the cabinet adopted on December 17, has moved away from the “basic defense concept” maintained by successive governments and has introduced the concept of “dynamic defense force.” It has made clear the fact that the Democratic Party of Japan’s definition of defense is more dangerous than that of the Liberal Democratic Party government.
“We shall do what the bureaucrat-led past LDP governments were unable to do,” Nagashima Akihisa, former DPJ parliamentary secretary on defense, proclaimed in regard to the significance of the DPJ version of the defense guideline.
The “basic defense concept” first appeared in the first defense guideline adopted in October 1976. This means that whatever takes place in the international situation, Japan should possess the necessary minimum of military forces throughout Japan, allegedly so as to not produce a “power vacuum” in regions surrounding Japan.
In the 1976 defense guideline, then Defense Agency Secretary General Sakata Michita explained that the “basic defense concept” came from the need to get away from the conventional thinking of the Cold War as between East and West and to assume the need for a stable regional balance among states rather than the need to counter specific threats.
Responding militarily to any military provocation
The new defense guideline bares its posture of hostility towards Japan’s neighboring countries. It for the first time sees China’s military buildup as a matter of concern to the international community.
Defense Minister Kitazawa Toshimi in a statement he made on December 17 said, “Dynamic deterrence by which a state shows its national intention and high defense capabilities is important, not by static deterrence of deterring (enemies) with the presence of defense.”
In response to the threat of large-scale military forces, including nuclear capabilities, of China, Russia, and North Korea, the new defense guideline underlines Japan’s intention to carry out activities that will openly show hostility towards them.
This means that the Japanese government is prepared to confront those which it regards as a threat or concern with a military response.
Qualitative enhancement
One member of a governmental panel on “security and defense capability in a new era”, which provided the basis for the conventional guideline in its report released in August, said, “The ‘basic defense concept’ used to be like a solid mass of goalkeepers in front of a soccer goal. We can no longer do that. From now on, Japan should select and enhance defense capabilities to provide state-of-the-art quality.”
Bolstering the Self-Defense Forces in the Nansei Islands, centering on Okinawa, is a concrete example of the enhancement.
The defense guideline states that Ground SDF units will be deployed to Yonaguni Island, which is a short distance from Taiwan. In order to put a brake on Chinese submarine activities in the East China Sea, the guideline states its plan to increase the number of Maritime SDF submarines for the first time in 30 years from 16 to 22. The guideline also calls for the deployment of additional Air SDF units and early-warning aircraft. These moves provide proof of the guideline’s aim to greatly increase land-sea-and-air defense capabilities.
It is probable that Japan’s strengthening of military capabilities under the guideline will increase the likelihood of provoking serious conflict. Amid the increasing tension between Japan and China due to the issue of territorial rights over the Senkaku Islands, the guideline may be construed as a message that Japan will counter China with its military threat and will have a negative impact on Japan-China relations. The guideline would also escalate military tensions between the two countries.
Furthermore, the guideline will impose further military burdens on Okinawan people. It states that the government will implement the plan to realign the U.S forces in Japan, which includes the plan to relocate the U.S. Marine Corps Futenma Air Station (Ginowan City) to the Henoko district in Nago City of Okinawa. This shows that the guideline intends to perpetuate the U.S. bases burden on Okinawans and turn Okinawa’s Sakishima Islands, where there has been no military base in the past, into a new military stronghold.
The SDF frequently visited the Sakishima Islands under the pretext of carrying out emergency drills, and the SDF’s use of civil airports in this area is increasing. Concerns are increasing over the SDF increase in mobilizations among the local people.
Transformation of SDF
The “dynamic defense force” policy includes the dispatch of the SDF abroad in addition to measures dealing with China and North Korea.
Since the 1990s, the former Liberal Democratic Party government accelerated the dispatch of SDF units abroad as well as the SDF integration with the U.S. forces, strengthened the SDF units deployed in the Kyushu region, and advanced the missile defense network. The policy shift toward a “dynamic defense force” was actually progressing all along.
Nagashima said, “Now that the Democratic Party of Japan has taken power, we should change our policy (from the ‘basic defense concept’) to ‘dynamic defense force’ in order to make use of the equipment and capabilities we already possess.” What Nagashima is saying is that the DPJ has officially declared the transformation of the SDF and wants to freely carry out any plans, including the revision of the five PKO principles and the Three Principles on Arms Exports, which the LDP government could not do despite their eagerness to do so. Then, what was the real intent of the political power change?
- Akahata, December 20, 2010
