April 7, 2011
The government and nuclear energy authorities admitted to the fact that they had not heeded a warning by the Japanese Communist Party about a possible nuclear accident involving a tsunami and that their initial response to the actual nuclear accident was inadequate and inexcusably late.
Grilling by Japanese Communist Party representative Yoshii Hidekatsu at the House of Representatives industrial committee on April 6 got them to acknowledge their mistake.
JCP warning becomes reality
Yoshii at the same committee of May 26 last year had warned of the danger of a meltdown due to a power outage after an earthquake or tsunami. To this, Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency (NISA) Director Terasaka Nobuaki had replied that it “would be logically possible” but nearly impossible in reality.
Yoshii said, “You were saying at that time that it may hypothetically occur, but it actually happened!”
Terasaka said, “What you had shown as possibility actually took place. I had a low sense of awareness concerning the danger and I now deeply regret it.”
Back in March 2006, also in the Lower House Budget Committee, Yoshii cautioned about the possibility of a major accident. Suzuki Atsuyuki, chair of the Nuclear Safety Commission (NSC) at that time (now the president of the Japan Atomic Energy Agency), responded that nuclear plants are equipped with multiple power-supply systems, including an external power supply, diesel generator, and batteries, and that the flexible usage of power from other plants is also possible so “it would be under control.”
Yoshii said, “You were saying that ‘it would be under control’ due to superior design, but all the power went off!”
Suzuki replied, “I apologize. I feel a sense of heartbreaking grief.”
Prime Minister Kan Naoto and Tokyo Electric Power Co. (TEPCO) President Shimizu Masataka described the nuclear accident as an “unexpected” incident. Yoshii, however, pointed out that the Japan Nuclear Energy Safety Organization had also sounded the alarm about a possible nuclear accident caused by a power loss.
Yoshii said, “On the assumption of a total loss of power, an incident like this must be prevented from occurring under any circumstance. This is the NSC mission, isn’t it?”
NSC Chair Madarame Haruki replied, “Yes, you are right. I profoundly regret the oversight and will instruct operators of nuclear energy facilities to never make such a mistake again.”
Industrial Minister Kaieda Banri admitted that the accident was not unexpected. He said, “We shouldn’t use the word ‘unexpected’.”
Govt’s initial response to N-accident is too late
At 3:42p.m. on March 11, about one hour after the occurrence of the earthquake, the NISA was already aware of the possibility of core meltdowns. However, emergency measures such as the opening of vents to release pressure in the reactor containment vessels were not taken until after 10:00a.m. the following morning (20 hours after the quake).
Yoshii said, “Why didn’t you instruct TEPCO earlier what steps would be appropriate to take? Or is it that TEPCO just didn’t follow your instructions?”
Kaieda answered, “As we had to issue an order based on relevant laws, it (the first motion) was issued the next day.”
Yoshii said, “NSC Chair Madarame and NISA Director Terasaka, did you prepare to issue the order with a sense of crisis?”
Madarame answered, “I didn’t know at that time how dangerous the situation was.”
Yoshii then asked the government spokesman, “Did you clearly tell TEPCO to release vapor from the pressure containers in order to lower pressure? Did you order TEPCO to put coolant water or seawater in?”
Chief Cabinet Secretary Edano Yukio answered, “We told TEPCO to hurry up and take action at 1:30a.m. (11 hours after the quake)”
A 10-hour period of indecision
Eventually, a vapor vent was conducted on the first reactor at 10:17a.m. of March 12 (20 hours after the quake) and TEPCO began pouring seawater into the first reactor at 8:20p.m. (30 hours after the quake).
At about 6:00a.m. on March 12 (16 hours after the quake), the most crucial moment in which the government should have ensured that emergency measures be taken, Prime Minister Kan Naoto and NSC Chair Madarame went to the Fukushima No.1 Nuclear Power Plant by helicopter, resulting in their 4.5-hour absence from the Cabinet nuclear disaster taskforce.
The government declared a state of emergency at 7:45a.m. on March 12 (17 hours after the quake). The first venting took place at 10:17a.m. (20 hours after the quake) and the industrial ministry ordered TEPCO to put seawater in the first reactor at 8:05p.m (30 hours after the quake). There had been a 10-hour period of indecisiveness in which the government did not do anything, Yoshii pointed out.
He said, “If TEPCO didn’t do anything, you were the ones who should have made it take action, but the prime minister and the NSC chair were not at the Cabinet taskforce for more than four hours. Not only that, there was the 10-hour blank period of inaction. What you did is an inexcusable mistake.”
Grilling by Japanese Communist Party representative Yoshii Hidekatsu at the House of Representatives industrial committee on April 6 got them to acknowledge their mistake.
JCP warning becomes reality
Yoshii at the same committee of May 26 last year had warned of the danger of a meltdown due to a power outage after an earthquake or tsunami. To this, Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency (NISA) Director Terasaka Nobuaki had replied that it “would be logically possible” but nearly impossible in reality.
Yoshii said, “You were saying at that time that it may hypothetically occur, but it actually happened!”
Terasaka said, “What you had shown as possibility actually took place. I had a low sense of awareness concerning the danger and I now deeply regret it.”
Back in March 2006, also in the Lower House Budget Committee, Yoshii cautioned about the possibility of a major accident. Suzuki Atsuyuki, chair of the Nuclear Safety Commission (NSC) at that time (now the president of the Japan Atomic Energy Agency), responded that nuclear plants are equipped with multiple power-supply systems, including an external power supply, diesel generator, and batteries, and that the flexible usage of power from other plants is also possible so “it would be under control.”
Yoshii said, “You were saying that ‘it would be under control’ due to superior design, but all the power went off!”
Suzuki replied, “I apologize. I feel a sense of heartbreaking grief.”
Prime Minister Kan Naoto and Tokyo Electric Power Co. (TEPCO) President Shimizu Masataka described the nuclear accident as an “unexpected” incident. Yoshii, however, pointed out that the Japan Nuclear Energy Safety Organization had also sounded the alarm about a possible nuclear accident caused by a power loss.
Yoshii said, “On the assumption of a total loss of power, an incident like this must be prevented from occurring under any circumstance. This is the NSC mission, isn’t it?”
NSC Chair Madarame Haruki replied, “Yes, you are right. I profoundly regret the oversight and will instruct operators of nuclear energy facilities to never make such a mistake again.”
Industrial Minister Kaieda Banri admitted that the accident was not unexpected. He said, “We shouldn’t use the word ‘unexpected’.”
Govt’s initial response to N-accident is too late
At 3:42p.m. on March 11, about one hour after the occurrence of the earthquake, the NISA was already aware of the possibility of core meltdowns. However, emergency measures such as the opening of vents to release pressure in the reactor containment vessels were not taken until after 10:00a.m. the following morning (20 hours after the quake).
Yoshii said, “Why didn’t you instruct TEPCO earlier what steps would be appropriate to take? Or is it that TEPCO just didn’t follow your instructions?”
Kaieda answered, “As we had to issue an order based on relevant laws, it (the first motion) was issued the next day.”
Yoshii said, “NSC Chair Madarame and NISA Director Terasaka, did you prepare to issue the order with a sense of crisis?”
Madarame answered, “I didn’t know at that time how dangerous the situation was.”
Yoshii then asked the government spokesman, “Did you clearly tell TEPCO to release vapor from the pressure containers in order to lower pressure? Did you order TEPCO to put coolant water or seawater in?”
Chief Cabinet Secretary Edano Yukio answered, “We told TEPCO to hurry up and take action at 1:30a.m. (11 hours after the quake)”
A 10-hour period of indecision
Eventually, a vapor vent was conducted on the first reactor at 10:17a.m. of March 12 (20 hours after the quake) and TEPCO began pouring seawater into the first reactor at 8:20p.m. (30 hours after the quake).
At about 6:00a.m. on March 12 (16 hours after the quake), the most crucial moment in which the government should have ensured that emergency measures be taken, Prime Minister Kan Naoto and NSC Chair Madarame went to the Fukushima No.1 Nuclear Power Plant by helicopter, resulting in their 4.5-hour absence from the Cabinet nuclear disaster taskforce.
The government declared a state of emergency at 7:45a.m. on March 12 (17 hours after the quake). The first venting took place at 10:17a.m. (20 hours after the quake) and the industrial ministry ordered TEPCO to put seawater in the first reactor at 8:05p.m (30 hours after the quake). There had been a 10-hour period of indecisiveness in which the government did not do anything, Yoshii pointed out.
He said, “If TEPCO didn’t do anything, you were the ones who should have made it take action, but the prime minister and the NSC chair were not at the Cabinet taskforce for more than four hours. Not only that, there was the 10-hour blank period of inaction. What you did is an inexcusable mistake.”
