March 31, 2010
Japanese Communist Party former Chair Fuwa Tetsuzo held a press conference on March 30 and revealed two U.S. declassified documents as evidence to show that the Japanese government had agreed on a bilateral secret agreement allowing the U.S. to bring nuclear weapons into Japan without prior consultation. The following is his statement at the press conference:
The Japanese Communist Party in the beginning of 2000 discovered at the U.S. National Archives and Records Administration a series of declassified documents that had been written around January 1960 when the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty was signed. Exhibiting these documents at the Diet, I urged the government to conduct a thorough investigation into secret arrangements concerning U.S. nuclear weapons’ entry into Japan at one-on-one debates with the prime minister on March 8, 22 and 29 (with Prime Minister Obuchi Keizo) as well as on April 19 (with Mori Yoshiro who took over Obuchi’s position after his death) in 2000. In the debates, I used the U.S. official documents to show that the “Record of Discussion,” initialed by and exchanged between representatives of the two governments on January 6, 1960, is a secret agreement and constitutes an integral part of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty. I also cited the documents to reveal that based on the secret pact, the U.S. had nuclear-armed warships enter Japanese ports without having prior consultation with the Japanese government and used Japanese ports as homeports for such vessels.
In response to my presentation at the Diet debates, the government only repeated a hackneyed answer: U.S. declassified documents are of no concern to the Japanese government, and there is no need to investigate the Foreign Ministry’s documents since secret agreements do not exist. The only grounds the government showed to support its claim was that many prime ministers had given the same response in past Diet discussions.
It has been 10 years since I introduced the matter for debate in the Diet. The Hatoyama Cabinet promised a thorough investigation of this issue right after its formation. The JCP promised to assist in the investigation and submitted to the government related U.S. diplomatic documents we had obtained, hoping for a positive outcome. However, the report on the investigation published by the government’s expert panel on March 9 betrayed our expectation.
The report acknowledged the existence of the “Record of Discussion” that I released in the Diet 10 years ago. However, the report insisted that the U.S. side had unilaterally interpreted Clause C of the second section of the “Record of Discussion” as giving a green light to the entry of U.S. vessels carrying nuclear weapons into Japan without prior consultation. The report stated, “There has been no evidence indicating that the U.S. side had provided its interpretation to the Japanese side” and therefore concluded that the “Record of Discussion” is not a secret pact on nuclear entry.
Based on the panel’s report, the government has callously determined that a secret agreement did not exist at the time the Security Treaty was signed in 1960 and that it will not call for the abrogation of the secret pact or take any other actions that could change its relations with the U.S. This is outrageous for those who are demanding that Japan be free of nuclear weapons by strictly maintaining its Three Non-Nuclear Principles.
We assert that the U.S. documents I submitted to the Diet and the government 10 years ago are enough evidence to prove that the “Record of Discussion” is a secret agreement reached between the two governments. However, the panel’s report refers to the process of bilateral negotiations as the grounds for its rejection to recognize the “Record of Discussion” as a secret arrangement. Therefore, in order to reveal the process and contents of the negotiations between the two governments during the period between 1958 and 1960, we conducted another round of investigation on the obtained U.S. declassified documents in cooperation with Niihara Shoji, a leading researcher of secret arrangements on nuclear entry. We then discovered two significant documents that explain how the “Record of Discussion” was created, how the U.S. side explained to Japan about it, and whether or not it is just a document written during the process of the bilateral negotiations or a final agreement between the two governments.
As I will explain, those two documents clearly suggest that the U.S. side from the beginning had claimed at official meetings with the Japanese government that the entry of nuclear-equipped vessels into Japan without prior consultation is a U.S. right guaranteed by the Security Treaty. They also show that the Japanese government had accepted the Security Treaty, the “Exchange of Notes,” and the “Record of Discussion” as well as their interpretation. These two documents therefore disprove the government panel’s position expressed in its report.
The first document: telegram written by Ambassador MacArthur describing first day of bilateral negotiation (October 4, 1958)
The first document is a telegram sent by U.S. Ambassador to Japan Douglas MacArthur II describing what he explained to representatives of the Japanese government (Prime Minister Kishi Nobusuke and Foreign Minister Fujiyama Aiichiro) on October 4, 1958, the first day of the bilateral negotiation for the Security Treaty. It was sent to U.S. Ambassador to the Philippines Charles Bohlen on October 22. At that time, the U.S. was in possession of Subic Bay Naval Base and Clark Air Base in the Philippines and was in the midst of negotiations with the Philippine government on bases and defense, including prior consultation about entry of nuclear weapons as a focal issue. As diplomats who were tackling the same subject, the two ambassadors were closely exchanging information.
(a) The telegram first reports that MacArthur presented to the Japanese side an “overall package which included the draft treaty, consultation formula, and explanation on our interpretation of that formula.” Those three documents at the end of the negotiations would be given shape as the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty, the “Exchange of Notes” between Kishi and Herter, and the “Record of Discussion.”
(b) It goes on to report that the U.S. side explained about its interpretation on prior consultation in accordance with joint State-Defense negotiating instructions.
The instructions have two sections regarding prior consultation for the “deployment of US Forces and their equipment in Japan.” Section (A) designates, “'[D]eployment of US Forces and their equipment into Japan' refers only to nuclear weapons.” Then Section (B) states, “[Q]uestion of entry into Japanese waters and ports of US warships carrying nuclear weapons shall continue as in past and not fall within consultation formula.”
There is no doubt that the U.S. side, on the first day of the negotiations, provided Japan with a clear explanation, leaving no room for misunderstanding regarding its position that the entry of U.S. nuclear-armed warships into Japan would not be subject to prior consultation. Although the instructions suggested that “our formula” be introduced “at an appropriate point,” the telegram indicates that Ambassador MacArthur considered it would be better to present the U.S. position at the beginning of the negotiations in order to reach a bilateral agreement.
(c) According to the telegram, MacArthur then asked Kishi and Fujiyama “for their views as to how the agreed interpretation might best be recorded.” He expressed his prospect in the telegram that the consultation formula would be made public but that the agreed interpretation “would probably remain confidential.” As he predicted, they took form as the “Exchange of Notes” (between Kishi and Herter) and the confidential agreement (“Record of Discussion”).
(d) The following part of the telegram is significant as well. Since the U.S. representative presented his government’s view on prior consultation on the first day of the negotiations, he was expecting to receive the Japanese government’s view. However, as the telegram states, only working-level Foreign Ministry officials asked some questions, but neither Kishi nor Fujiyama made any “substantive response to any of our proposals.”
Therefore, the first day of the negotiations ended with the expectation that the two governments would, in following discussion, have detailed negotiations on how to express the U.S.-proposed “overall package” in a written document.
The report recently published by the Japanese government panel reveals that before the negotiations, the Japanese side had prepared the following draft about prior consultation:
“The United States will not bring nuclear weapons into Japan without the Japanese government’s prior agreement. This will be effective not only to U.S. warships deployed to Japan but also to U.S. vessels and aircraft temporarily visiting Japan (“Japan’s draft on deployment of U.S. forces and their use,” July 2, August 13, 1958).”
The panel report states that this draft was not presented to the U.S. side. If the draft contains the real intention of the Japanese government, it should have been presented by the Japanese government to the U.S. side on the first day of the negotiations. Any traces indicating that the Japanese side had explained its draft to the U.S. during the negotiations was never found by the government panel.
During the bilateral negotiations which began in October 1958, the U.S. explained its position on the first day that port calls of nuclear-armed warships into Japan should be excluded from the subject of prior consultation, but Japan never presented its opinion that they should be subject to prior consultation. Where in the negotiation process did the government panel find reasonable grounds to support its claim that while exchanging the “Record of Discussion,” the two governments never shared the same interpretation of it?
Second document: Telegram from Ambassador MacArthur (dated June 20, 1959)
The second document is the telegram that Ambassador MacArthur sent to U.S. Secretary of State Herter on June 20, 1959 reporting that the negotiation on the crucial matters concerning the revision of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty was completed and the Japanese and the U.S. governments had reached a “complete agreement.”
The telegram illustrated how the negotiations went on to the final stage.
In the telegram, Ambassador MacArthur said that he had presented to Foreign Minister Fujiyama the U.S. drafted “package proposal” on June 18 and indicated that the proposal was a “single package” which should be accepted or rejected as a package deal. This showed that even in the final stage of the negotiations, the U.S. regarded the treaty, the exchange of notes, and the record of discussion as a package, drew up a final draft, and urged the Japanese government to accept the entire draft by issuing a final warning.
In the evening of June 19, MacArthur met with Fujiyama to hear Prime Minister Kishi Nobusuke’s reaction to the “package.” In the telegram, MacArthur said that although Kishi “accepted all points of substance in the package,” there was one point that Kishi wanted to revise. What Kishi requested was to delete the phrase, “In the light of circumstances prevailing at the time,” from the “exchange of notes” which was scheduled to be publicized.
As a result of the negotiations, the phrase was deleted so it is impossible for us to ascertain the original sentence in which the phrase was included. The phrase may have been inserted in order to explain conditions for cases that will “be subject to a prior consultation.”
When Prime Minister Kishi received the package proposal composed of the treaty, the exchange of notes, and the “Record of Discussion,” he only asked to revise one point while “accepting all points of substance in the package.” This fact is significant because after examining the details, Kishi formally agreed with the whole of the three documents except for one minor point.
Ambassador MacArthur immediately conveyed Kishi’s demand to the U.S. Department of the Interior. On the morning of June 20, MacArthur told Fujiyama that the U.S. accepted Kishi’s demand.
Regarding this issue, MacArthur in the telegram said, “I told Fujiyama that we agree to delete the above clause, thus completing agreement on treaty, consultation formula and record of discussion.” Then, together with the two other matters negotiated, he summarized all agreements they had reached as follows:
“In light of above, we now have completed agreement with Kishi and Fujiyama on (a) new treaty of mutual cooperation and security, (b) exchange of notes containing public consultation formula; (c) record of discussion interpreting the formula; (d) exchange of notes on continued validity of decisions, etc., of joint committee; and (e) exchange of notes on continued validity of Rusk-Okazaki official minutes.”
As this telegram indicates, the Japanese and the U.S. governments during their negotiations considered that the new Japan-U.S. Security Treaty, the exchanged notes between Prime Minister Kishi and U.S. State of Secretary Herter, and the “Record of Discussion” together formed the treaty in a single package. They thoroughly examined every single word, agreed on interpretation, and finally confirmed a “complete agreement” on all documents as a package. The Foreign Ministry’s expert panel, however, argued that although the two governments agreed on the treaty and the exchange of notes, they had different interpretations on the “Record of Discussion.” Such an argument is untenable.
The negotiations continued to December 1959 because of the new proposal from the U.S. regarding the U.S. forces operations in case of an emergency on the Korean Peninsula. In the meeting between Fujiyama and MacArthur held on January 6, 1960, the “Record of Discussion”, the “exchange of notes on continued validity of decisions, etc., of joint committee,” and “Minutes for First Meeting of Security Consultative Meeting (an agreement on the response to an emergency on Korean Peninsula) were initialed the secret agreements.
We urge the Japanese government to examine the actual circumstance of Japan under the secret nuclear agreements by recognizing these two documents (telegrams by MacArthur) as new evidence and to take necessary measures to nulify the secret pacts on nuclear arms entry in order to end allowing the introduction of nuclear weapons to Japan.
- Akahata, March 31, 2010
Document 1:
Telegram from U.S. Ambassador to Japan Douglas MacArthur II to U.S. Ambassador to the Philippines Charles Bohlen, October 22, 1958
TELEGRAM
OUTGOING
American Embassy TOKYO
SECRET
October 22, 1958
Amembassy MANILA
Rptd Info: SECSTATE
LIMITED DISTRIBUTION
MANILA for Ambassador BOHLEN
Redeptel 1096 to you, consultation formula (as given in Deptel 771 of September 13 to you) was presented by me to Kishi and Fujiyama in first negotiating session on October 4 as part of overall package, which included draft treaty, consultation formula, explanation of our interpretation of that formula. Interpretation was in accordance with joint State-Defense negotiating instructions which were as follows:
"At an appropriate point introduce and seek agreement to our formula to meet Japanese requests with regard to consultation on the deployment of US Forces and their equipment in Japan. During course negotiation seek confirmation our understanding following points:
(A) That 'deployment of US Forces and their equipment into Japan' refers only to nuclear weapons and (B) question of entry into Japanese waters and ports of US warships carrying nuclear weapons shall continue as in past and not fall within consultation formula."
I asked Kishi and Fujiyama for their views as to how agreed interpretation might best be recorded. Present prospect is that consultation formula itself, in whatever form finally agreed, would be made public, perhaps as agreed minute or in Exchange of Notes. Agreed interpretation however would probably remain confidential, although it would serve as a basis for public explanation by both sides as to what consultation formula actually meant in practice.
As to jurisdiction, I also presented our proposal, as in Deptel 924 to you, to Kishi and Fujiyama in October 4 meeting.
Although working-level Foreign Ministry officials have asked for clarification of several points in original package, neither at October 4 meeting nor subsequently have Kishi or Fujiyama made substantive response to any of our proposals. There is a second meeting today and we may learn something of their reaction. Will keep you posted on all developments re these two aspects of interest and concern to your negotiation. Until we have reached stage where we know that there is agreement between US and Japanese Governments on both these issues, it is imperative these matters not repeat not be discussed with or revealed to Philippine Government. There may have to be some give and take and it is thus of utmost importance that progress of negotiations be closely held. In particular we are anxious that fact initial draft was presented by us be permanently obscured. Final product of any agreements with Japanese will have to be put forward as outcome of joint consultation and joint drafting if it is to be favorably accepted in Japan. I will count on you to restrict distribution of this and other related messages to those having real need to know.
MacARTHUR
Document 2:
Telegram from U.S. Ambassador to Japan Douglas MacArthur II to U.S. Secretary of State Christian Herter, June 20, 1959
INCOMING TELEGRAM
Department of State
CONFIDENTIAL
CORRECTION ISSUED:
6/21/59, 5AM
Control: 15067
Rec'd: JUNE 20, 1959
7:35 AM
FROM: TOKYO - CORRECTED COPY
TO: Secretary of State
NO: 2745, JUNE 20, 7PM
SENT DEPARTMENT 2745; REPEATED INFORMATION CINCPAC 747, COMUSJAPAN 515
CINCPAC EXCLUSIVE FOR ADMIRAL FELT AND POLAD; COMUSJAPAN EXCLUSIVE FOR GENERAL BURNS
LIMIT DISTRIBUTION
EMBASSY TELEGRAM 2733
I SAW FUJIYAMA LAST NIGHT TO OBTAIN HIS REACTION TO THE PACKAGE PROPOSAL I HAD PRESENTED PREVIOUS DAY. FUJIYAMA SAID HE HAD DISCUSSED THIS MATTER WITH KISHI. SINCE I HAD INDICATED THAT PROPOSAL WAS SINGLE PACKAGE WHICH SHOULD BE ACCEPTED OR REJECTED IN TOTO AND NOT DEALT WITH PIECEMEAL ITEM BY ITEM, HE WAS AUTHORIZED TO INFORM ME THAT KISHI ACCEPTED ALL POINTS OF SUBSTANCE IN THE PACKAGE. THERE WAS, HOWEVER, ONE POINT ON FORM WHICH KISHI FELT IT WAS NOT POSSIBLE TO ACCEPT. THIS WAS ADDITION OF WORD "IN THE LIGHT OF CIRCUMSTANCES PREVAILING AT THE TIME" AT END OF PUBLIC FORMULA.
FUJIYAMA SAID PRIME MINISTER FEELS STRONGLY THAT ADDITION OF THAT PHRASE WOULD RENDER THE ENTIRE PUBLIC FORMULA AMBIGUOUS. IT WOULD BE IMMEDIATELY CLAIMED THAT WE HAD NOT REALLY UNDERTAKEN TO CONSULT, AND THAT CLAIM WOULD HAVE SOME PLAUSIBILITY NOT ONLY WITH SOCIALISTS BUT WITH GENERAL PUBLIC. FUJIYAMA SAID KISHI AND HE UNDERSTOOD THAT WE HAD NOT INTENDED THAT OUR PROPOSAL TAKE AWAY IN LAST CLAUSE WHAT HAD BEEN GIVEN IN EARLIER PART OF SENTENCE. BUT SUCH IMPRESSION WOULD INEVITABLY BE CREATED AND WOULD GREATLY IMPAIR PUBLIC ACCEPTABILITY OF TREATY AND CONSULTATION FORMULA, CREATING MAJOR TROUBLE FOR KISHI GOVERNMENT. SINCE PHRASE "IN THE LIGHT OF CIRCUMSTANCES PREVAILING AT THE TIME" IS NOT REALLY MATTER OF SUBSTANCE, KISHI WISHED ME TO KNOW THAT IF WE WOULD AGREE TO WITHDRAW IT WE COULD SETTLE ON BASIS OF MY PACKAGE PROPOSAL.
RE ARTICLE VI, FUJIYAMA SAID KISHI AND HE WOULD ACCEPT OUR LATEST PROPOSAL, TO HAVE THE ARTICLE BEGIN "FOR THE PURPOSE OF CONTRIBUTING TO THE SECURITY OF JAPAN AND THE MAINTENANCE OF INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY IN THE FAR EAST."
SINCE I HAD STRONGLY URGED INCLUSION OF PHRASE "IN THE LIGHT OF CIRCUMSTANCES PREVAILING AT THE TIME" IN CONSULTATION FORMULA, I TOLD FUJIYAMA I WOULD MAKE KISHI'S VIEWS KNOWN IMMEDIATELY TO WASHINGTON AND HOPED TO LET HIM KNOW WASHINGTON'S REACTION TODAY. THIS MORNING, AS AUTHORIZED FIRST PARAGRAPH DEPARTMENT TELEGRAM 1975, I TOLD FUJIYAMA THAT WE AGREE TO DELETE THE ABOVE CLAUSE. THUS COMPLETING AGREEMENT ON TREATY, CONSULTATION FORMULA AND RECORD OF DISCUSSION.
IN LIGHT OF ABOVE, WE NOW HAVE COMPLETE AGREEMENT WITH KISHI AND FUJIYAMA ON (A) NEW TREATY OF MUTUAL COOPERATION AND SECURITY; (B) EXCHANGE OF NOTES CONTAINING PUBLIC CONSULTATION FORMULA; (C) RECORD OF DISCUSSION INTERPRETING THE FORMULA; (D) EXCHANGE OF NOTES ON CONTINUED VALIDITY OF DECISIONS, ETC., OF JOINT COMMITTEE; AND (E) EXCHANGE OF NOTES ON CONTINUED VALIDITY OF RUSK-OKAZAKI OFFICIAL MINUTES (EMBASSY TELEGRAM 2744).
FUJIYAMA EXPLAINED THAT WHILE THERE IS AGREEMENT BETWEEN US ON ABOVE MATTERS, BEFORE THERE CAN BE FINAL AGREEMENT OF GOJ THESE MATTERS WILL HAVE TO BE DISCUSSED AND APPROVED BY THE NEW PARTY LEADERSHIP AND CABINET. BUT HE AND KISHI ANTICIPATE NO GREAT DIFFICULTIES.
MACARTHUR
-Akahata, March 31, 2010
In response to my presentation at the Diet debates, the government only repeated a hackneyed answer: U.S. declassified documents are of no concern to the Japanese government, and there is no need to investigate the Foreign Ministry’s documents since secret agreements do not exist. The only grounds the government showed to support its claim was that many prime ministers had given the same response in past Diet discussions.
It has been 10 years since I introduced the matter for debate in the Diet. The Hatoyama Cabinet promised a thorough investigation of this issue right after its formation. The JCP promised to assist in the investigation and submitted to the government related U.S. diplomatic documents we had obtained, hoping for a positive outcome. However, the report on the investigation published by the government’s expert panel on March 9 betrayed our expectation.
The report acknowledged the existence of the “Record of Discussion” that I released in the Diet 10 years ago. However, the report insisted that the U.S. side had unilaterally interpreted Clause C of the second section of the “Record of Discussion” as giving a green light to the entry of U.S. vessels carrying nuclear weapons into Japan without prior consultation. The report stated, “There has been no evidence indicating that the U.S. side had provided its interpretation to the Japanese side” and therefore concluded that the “Record of Discussion” is not a secret pact on nuclear entry.
Based on the panel’s report, the government has callously determined that a secret agreement did not exist at the time the Security Treaty was signed in 1960 and that it will not call for the abrogation of the secret pact or take any other actions that could change its relations with the U.S. This is outrageous for those who are demanding that Japan be free of nuclear weapons by strictly maintaining its Three Non-Nuclear Principles.
We assert that the U.S. documents I submitted to the Diet and the government 10 years ago are enough evidence to prove that the “Record of Discussion” is a secret agreement reached between the two governments. However, the panel’s report refers to the process of bilateral negotiations as the grounds for its rejection to recognize the “Record of Discussion” as a secret arrangement. Therefore, in order to reveal the process and contents of the negotiations between the two governments during the period between 1958 and 1960, we conducted another round of investigation on the obtained U.S. declassified documents in cooperation with Niihara Shoji, a leading researcher of secret arrangements on nuclear entry. We then discovered two significant documents that explain how the “Record of Discussion” was created, how the U.S. side explained to Japan about it, and whether or not it is just a document written during the process of the bilateral negotiations or a final agreement between the two governments.
As I will explain, those two documents clearly suggest that the U.S. side from the beginning had claimed at official meetings with the Japanese government that the entry of nuclear-equipped vessels into Japan without prior consultation is a U.S. right guaranteed by the Security Treaty. They also show that the Japanese government had accepted the Security Treaty, the “Exchange of Notes,” and the “Record of Discussion” as well as their interpretation. These two documents therefore disprove the government panel’s position expressed in its report.
The first document: telegram written by Ambassador MacArthur describing first day of bilateral negotiation (October 4, 1958)
The first document is a telegram sent by U.S. Ambassador to Japan Douglas MacArthur II describing what he explained to representatives of the Japanese government (Prime Minister Kishi Nobusuke and Foreign Minister Fujiyama Aiichiro) on October 4, 1958, the first day of the bilateral negotiation for the Security Treaty. It was sent to U.S. Ambassador to the Philippines Charles Bohlen on October 22. At that time, the U.S. was in possession of Subic Bay Naval Base and Clark Air Base in the Philippines and was in the midst of negotiations with the Philippine government on bases and defense, including prior consultation about entry of nuclear weapons as a focal issue. As diplomats who were tackling the same subject, the two ambassadors were closely exchanging information.
(a) The telegram first reports that MacArthur presented to the Japanese side an “overall package which included the draft treaty, consultation formula, and explanation on our interpretation of that formula.” Those three documents at the end of the negotiations would be given shape as the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty, the “Exchange of Notes” between Kishi and Herter, and the “Record of Discussion.”
(b) It goes on to report that the U.S. side explained about its interpretation on prior consultation in accordance with joint State-Defense negotiating instructions.
The instructions have two sections regarding prior consultation for the “deployment of US Forces and their equipment in Japan.” Section (A) designates, “'[D]eployment of US Forces and their equipment into Japan' refers only to nuclear weapons.” Then Section (B) states, “[Q]uestion of entry into Japanese waters and ports of US warships carrying nuclear weapons shall continue as in past and not fall within consultation formula.”
There is no doubt that the U.S. side, on the first day of the negotiations, provided Japan with a clear explanation, leaving no room for misunderstanding regarding its position that the entry of U.S. nuclear-armed warships into Japan would not be subject to prior consultation. Although the instructions suggested that “our formula” be introduced “at an appropriate point,” the telegram indicates that Ambassador MacArthur considered it would be better to present the U.S. position at the beginning of the negotiations in order to reach a bilateral agreement.
(c) According to the telegram, MacArthur then asked Kishi and Fujiyama “for their views as to how the agreed interpretation might best be recorded.” He expressed his prospect in the telegram that the consultation formula would be made public but that the agreed interpretation “would probably remain confidential.” As he predicted, they took form as the “Exchange of Notes” (between Kishi and Herter) and the confidential agreement (“Record of Discussion”).
(d) The following part of the telegram is significant as well. Since the U.S. representative presented his government’s view on prior consultation on the first day of the negotiations, he was expecting to receive the Japanese government’s view. However, as the telegram states, only working-level Foreign Ministry officials asked some questions, but neither Kishi nor Fujiyama made any “substantive response to any of our proposals.”
Therefore, the first day of the negotiations ended with the expectation that the two governments would, in following discussion, have detailed negotiations on how to express the U.S.-proposed “overall package” in a written document.
The report recently published by the Japanese government panel reveals that before the negotiations, the Japanese side had prepared the following draft about prior consultation:
“The United States will not bring nuclear weapons into Japan without the Japanese government’s prior agreement. This will be effective not only to U.S. warships deployed to Japan but also to U.S. vessels and aircraft temporarily visiting Japan (“Japan’s draft on deployment of U.S. forces and their use,” July 2, August 13, 1958).”
The panel report states that this draft was not presented to the U.S. side. If the draft contains the real intention of the Japanese government, it should have been presented by the Japanese government to the U.S. side on the first day of the negotiations. Any traces indicating that the Japanese side had explained its draft to the U.S. during the negotiations was never found by the government panel.
During the bilateral negotiations which began in October 1958, the U.S. explained its position on the first day that port calls of nuclear-armed warships into Japan should be excluded from the subject of prior consultation, but Japan never presented its opinion that they should be subject to prior consultation. Where in the negotiation process did the government panel find reasonable grounds to support its claim that while exchanging the “Record of Discussion,” the two governments never shared the same interpretation of it?
Second document: Telegram from Ambassador MacArthur (dated June 20, 1959)
The second document is the telegram that Ambassador MacArthur sent to U.S. Secretary of State Herter on June 20, 1959 reporting that the negotiation on the crucial matters concerning the revision of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty was completed and the Japanese and the U.S. governments had reached a “complete agreement.”
The telegram illustrated how the negotiations went on to the final stage.
In the telegram, Ambassador MacArthur said that he had presented to Foreign Minister Fujiyama the U.S. drafted “package proposal” on June 18 and indicated that the proposal was a “single package” which should be accepted or rejected as a package deal. This showed that even in the final stage of the negotiations, the U.S. regarded the treaty, the exchange of notes, and the record of discussion as a package, drew up a final draft, and urged the Japanese government to accept the entire draft by issuing a final warning.
In the evening of June 19, MacArthur met with Fujiyama to hear Prime Minister Kishi Nobusuke’s reaction to the “package.” In the telegram, MacArthur said that although Kishi “accepted all points of substance in the package,” there was one point that Kishi wanted to revise. What Kishi requested was to delete the phrase, “In the light of circumstances prevailing at the time,” from the “exchange of notes” which was scheduled to be publicized.
As a result of the negotiations, the phrase was deleted so it is impossible for us to ascertain the original sentence in which the phrase was included. The phrase may have been inserted in order to explain conditions for cases that will “be subject to a prior consultation.”
When Prime Minister Kishi received the package proposal composed of the treaty, the exchange of notes, and the “Record of Discussion,” he only asked to revise one point while “accepting all points of substance in the package.” This fact is significant because after examining the details, Kishi formally agreed with the whole of the three documents except for one minor point.
Ambassador MacArthur immediately conveyed Kishi’s demand to the U.S. Department of the Interior. On the morning of June 20, MacArthur told Fujiyama that the U.S. accepted Kishi’s demand.
Regarding this issue, MacArthur in the telegram said, “I told Fujiyama that we agree to delete the above clause, thus completing agreement on treaty, consultation formula and record of discussion.” Then, together with the two other matters negotiated, he summarized all agreements they had reached as follows:
“In light of above, we now have completed agreement with Kishi and Fujiyama on (a) new treaty of mutual cooperation and security, (b) exchange of notes containing public consultation formula; (c) record of discussion interpreting the formula; (d) exchange of notes on continued validity of decisions, etc., of joint committee; and (e) exchange of notes on continued validity of Rusk-Okazaki official minutes.”
As this telegram indicates, the Japanese and the U.S. governments during their negotiations considered that the new Japan-U.S. Security Treaty, the exchanged notes between Prime Minister Kishi and U.S. State of Secretary Herter, and the “Record of Discussion” together formed the treaty in a single package. They thoroughly examined every single word, agreed on interpretation, and finally confirmed a “complete agreement” on all documents as a package. The Foreign Ministry’s expert panel, however, argued that although the two governments agreed on the treaty and the exchange of notes, they had different interpretations on the “Record of Discussion.” Such an argument is untenable.
The negotiations continued to December 1959 because of the new proposal from the U.S. regarding the U.S. forces operations in case of an emergency on the Korean Peninsula. In the meeting between Fujiyama and MacArthur held on January 6, 1960, the “Record of Discussion”, the “exchange of notes on continued validity of decisions, etc., of joint committee,” and “Minutes for First Meeting of Security Consultative Meeting (an agreement on the response to an emergency on Korean Peninsula) were initialed the secret agreements.
We urge the Japanese government to examine the actual circumstance of Japan under the secret nuclear agreements by recognizing these two documents (telegrams by MacArthur) as new evidence and to take necessary measures to nulify the secret pacts on nuclear arms entry in order to end allowing the introduction of nuclear weapons to Japan.
- Akahata, March 31, 2010
Document 1:
Telegram from U.S. Ambassador to Japan Douglas MacArthur II to U.S. Ambassador to the Philippines Charles Bohlen, October 22, 1958
TELEGRAM
OUTGOING
American Embassy TOKYO
SECRET
October 22, 1958
Amembassy MANILA
Rptd Info: SECSTATE
LIMITED DISTRIBUTION
MANILA for Ambassador BOHLEN
Redeptel 1096 to you, consultation formula (as given in Deptel 771 of September 13 to you) was presented by me to Kishi and Fujiyama in first negotiating session on October 4 as part of overall package, which included draft treaty, consultation formula, explanation of our interpretation of that formula. Interpretation was in accordance with joint State-Defense negotiating instructions which were as follows:
"At an appropriate point introduce and seek agreement to our formula to meet Japanese requests with regard to consultation on the deployment of US Forces and their equipment in Japan. During course negotiation seek confirmation our understanding following points:
(A) That 'deployment of US Forces and their equipment into Japan' refers only to nuclear weapons and (B) question of entry into Japanese waters and ports of US warships carrying nuclear weapons shall continue as in past and not fall within consultation formula."
I asked Kishi and Fujiyama for their views as to how agreed interpretation might best be recorded. Present prospect is that consultation formula itself, in whatever form finally agreed, would be made public, perhaps as agreed minute or in Exchange of Notes. Agreed interpretation however would probably remain confidential, although it would serve as a basis for public explanation by both sides as to what consultation formula actually meant in practice.
As to jurisdiction, I also presented our proposal, as in Deptel 924 to you, to Kishi and Fujiyama in October 4 meeting.
Although working-level Foreign Ministry officials have asked for clarification of several points in original package, neither at October 4 meeting nor subsequently have Kishi or Fujiyama made substantive response to any of our proposals. There is a second meeting today and we may learn something of their reaction. Will keep you posted on all developments re these two aspects of interest and concern to your negotiation. Until we have reached stage where we know that there is agreement between US and Japanese Governments on both these issues, it is imperative these matters not repeat not be discussed with or revealed to Philippine Government. There may have to be some give and take and it is thus of utmost importance that progress of negotiations be closely held. In particular we are anxious that fact initial draft was presented by us be permanently obscured. Final product of any agreements with Japanese will have to be put forward as outcome of joint consultation and joint drafting if it is to be favorably accepted in Japan. I will count on you to restrict distribution of this and other related messages to those having real need to know.
MacARTHUR
Document 2:
Telegram from U.S. Ambassador to Japan Douglas MacArthur II to U.S. Secretary of State Christian Herter, June 20, 1959
INCOMING TELEGRAM
Department of State
CONFIDENTIAL
CORRECTION ISSUED:
6/21/59, 5AM
Control: 15067
Rec'd: JUNE 20, 1959
7:35 AM
FROM: TOKYO - CORRECTED COPY
TO: Secretary of State
NO: 2745, JUNE 20, 7PM
SENT DEPARTMENT 2745; REPEATED INFORMATION CINCPAC 747, COMUSJAPAN 515
CINCPAC EXCLUSIVE FOR ADMIRAL FELT AND POLAD; COMUSJAPAN EXCLUSIVE FOR GENERAL BURNS
LIMIT DISTRIBUTION
EMBASSY TELEGRAM 2733
I SAW FUJIYAMA LAST NIGHT TO OBTAIN HIS REACTION TO THE PACKAGE PROPOSAL I HAD PRESENTED PREVIOUS DAY. FUJIYAMA SAID HE HAD DISCUSSED THIS MATTER WITH KISHI. SINCE I HAD INDICATED THAT PROPOSAL WAS SINGLE PACKAGE WHICH SHOULD BE ACCEPTED OR REJECTED IN TOTO AND NOT DEALT WITH PIECEMEAL ITEM BY ITEM, HE WAS AUTHORIZED TO INFORM ME THAT KISHI ACCEPTED ALL POINTS OF SUBSTANCE IN THE PACKAGE. THERE WAS, HOWEVER, ONE POINT ON FORM WHICH KISHI FELT IT WAS NOT POSSIBLE TO ACCEPT. THIS WAS ADDITION OF WORD "IN THE LIGHT OF CIRCUMSTANCES PREVAILING AT THE TIME" AT END OF PUBLIC FORMULA.
FUJIYAMA SAID PRIME MINISTER FEELS STRONGLY THAT ADDITION OF THAT PHRASE WOULD RENDER THE ENTIRE PUBLIC FORMULA AMBIGUOUS. IT WOULD BE IMMEDIATELY CLAIMED THAT WE HAD NOT REALLY UNDERTAKEN TO CONSULT, AND THAT CLAIM WOULD HAVE SOME PLAUSIBILITY NOT ONLY WITH SOCIALISTS BUT WITH GENERAL PUBLIC. FUJIYAMA SAID KISHI AND HE UNDERSTOOD THAT WE HAD NOT INTENDED THAT OUR PROPOSAL TAKE AWAY IN LAST CLAUSE WHAT HAD BEEN GIVEN IN EARLIER PART OF SENTENCE. BUT SUCH IMPRESSION WOULD INEVITABLY BE CREATED AND WOULD GREATLY IMPAIR PUBLIC ACCEPTABILITY OF TREATY AND CONSULTATION FORMULA, CREATING MAJOR TROUBLE FOR KISHI GOVERNMENT. SINCE PHRASE "IN THE LIGHT OF CIRCUMSTANCES PREVAILING AT THE TIME" IS NOT REALLY MATTER OF SUBSTANCE, KISHI WISHED ME TO KNOW THAT IF WE WOULD AGREE TO WITHDRAW IT WE COULD SETTLE ON BASIS OF MY PACKAGE PROPOSAL.
RE ARTICLE VI, FUJIYAMA SAID KISHI AND HE WOULD ACCEPT OUR LATEST PROPOSAL, TO HAVE THE ARTICLE BEGIN "FOR THE PURPOSE OF CONTRIBUTING TO THE SECURITY OF JAPAN AND THE MAINTENANCE OF INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY IN THE FAR EAST."
SINCE I HAD STRONGLY URGED INCLUSION OF PHRASE "IN THE LIGHT OF CIRCUMSTANCES PREVAILING AT THE TIME" IN CONSULTATION FORMULA, I TOLD FUJIYAMA I WOULD MAKE KISHI'S VIEWS KNOWN IMMEDIATELY TO WASHINGTON AND HOPED TO LET HIM KNOW WASHINGTON'S REACTION TODAY. THIS MORNING, AS AUTHORIZED FIRST PARAGRAPH DEPARTMENT TELEGRAM 1975, I TOLD FUJIYAMA THAT WE AGREE TO DELETE THE ABOVE CLAUSE. THUS COMPLETING AGREEMENT ON TREATY, CONSULTATION FORMULA AND RECORD OF DISCUSSION.
IN LIGHT OF ABOVE, WE NOW HAVE COMPLETE AGREEMENT WITH KISHI AND FUJIYAMA ON (A) NEW TREATY OF MUTUAL COOPERATION AND SECURITY; (B) EXCHANGE OF NOTES CONTAINING PUBLIC CONSULTATION FORMULA; (C) RECORD OF DISCUSSION INTERPRETING THE FORMULA; (D) EXCHANGE OF NOTES ON CONTINUED VALIDITY OF DECISIONS, ETC., OF JOINT COMMITTEE; AND (E) EXCHANGE OF NOTES ON CONTINUED VALIDITY OF RUSK-OKAZAKI OFFICIAL MINUTES (EMBASSY TELEGRAM 2744).
FUJIYAMA EXPLAINED THAT WHILE THERE IS AGREEMENT BETWEEN US ON ABOVE MATTERS, BEFORE THERE CAN BE FINAL AGREEMENT OF GOJ THESE MATTERS WILL HAVE TO BE DISCUSSED AND APPROVED BY THE NEW PARTY LEADERSHIP AND CABINET. BUT HE AND KISHI ANTICIPATE NO GREAT DIFFICULTIES.
MACARTHUR
-Akahata, March 31, 2010
