October 9 & 10, 2012
The Japanese economy has been distorted under U.S. pressure. How can the U.S. have so much influence in Japan’s affairs?
Following is a summary of a document titled, “Annual Reform Recommendations from the Government of the United States to the Government of Japan under the U.S.-Japan Regulatory Reform and Competition Policy Initiative”.
Annual Reform Recommendations
The “recommendations” had annually been issued since 1994 until a government change occurred in Japan in 2009, in the form of exchanging economic requests with each other.
U.S. recommendations to Japan ranged from industrial policy to competition policy, transparency, legal systems reform, commercial law revisions, customs procedures, and trade.
Setting up working groups by category, the two countries examined the requests and gave shape to them. Relevant U.S. authorities such as the Trade Representative Office and the Department of Commerce placed their demands on Japan at each working group specialized in communications, information technologies, pharmaceuticals and medical devices, and so on.
Japan was also able to make its requests to the United States but it was always its counterpart who exerted overwhelming power.
Former senior official of the Ministry of International Trade and Industry, Hatakeyama Noboru recalls in his book, “That was the institutionalization of ‘interference in domestic affairs’.” In the 1990s, he took charge of Japan-U.S. Structural Impediments Initiative consultations.
At a Japan-U.S. Summit meeting in July 1993, Prime Minister Miyazawa Kiichi agreed to make annual reform recommendations with President Bill Clinton.
The United States at that time had a policy of giving a boost to U.S. multinationals to fully enter into the world market, and listed Japan at the top of the policy priority. In order to smooth the way to expand trade with Japan, the U.S. side tried to revamp Japanese trade regulations. Then, the Annual Reform Recommendations were born so as to remove so-called structural impediments.
Partnership for Growth
In 1997, PM Hashimoto Ryutaro and President Clinton agreed on “recommendations” based on the Enhanced Initiative on Deregulation and Competition Policy.
In June 2001, PM Koizumi Jun’ichiro and President George W. Bush announced a joint economic program called Partnership for Growth, further facilitating the U.S. intervention policy.
In December 2001, the Council on Foreign Relations, a U.S. governmental think-tank, released “directions” for U.S. economic policy toward Japan, aiming at remaking Japan in the name of globalization. The “directions” recommended that the Japanese market be opened to foreign enterprises, create an investment-friendly environment, ease requirements for M & A, and adopt U.S.-style business management, trade practice, and employment practices.
The “directions” were emphasizing that it will be wise for the U.S. to win over a Japanese group calling for “structural reform” to the U.S. side as a U.S. partner.
By reference to these “directions”, the Bush administration crafted its economic strategy to deal with Japan and urged the Koizumi Cabinet to include recommendations written in the “directions” into Koizumi’s “structural reform” scheme. Koizumi, in response, met almost all the U.S. demands.
The two figures even prepared a system to allow business leaders of both countries to participate in intergovernmental talks. Thus, the U.S. and Japanese governments, the Japan-U.S. financial world, and large corporations came to control the Japanese economy.
>Economy in subordination to US - II: Pressure for postal service privatization
>Economy in subordination to US - III: Destruction of local economiesn
>Economy in subordination to US - IV: TPP, US final demand
Following is a summary of a document titled, “Annual Reform Recommendations from the Government of the United States to the Government of Japan under the U.S.-Japan Regulatory Reform and Competition Policy Initiative”.
Annual Reform Recommendations
The “recommendations” had annually been issued since 1994 until a government change occurred in Japan in 2009, in the form of exchanging economic requests with each other.
U.S. recommendations to Japan ranged from industrial policy to competition policy, transparency, legal systems reform, commercial law revisions, customs procedures, and trade.
Setting up working groups by category, the two countries examined the requests and gave shape to them. Relevant U.S. authorities such as the Trade Representative Office and the Department of Commerce placed their demands on Japan at each working group specialized in communications, information technologies, pharmaceuticals and medical devices, and so on.
Japan was also able to make its requests to the United States but it was always its counterpart who exerted overwhelming power.
Former senior official of the Ministry of International Trade and Industry, Hatakeyama Noboru recalls in his book, “That was the institutionalization of ‘interference in domestic affairs’.” In the 1990s, he took charge of Japan-U.S. Structural Impediments Initiative consultations.
At a Japan-U.S. Summit meeting in July 1993, Prime Minister Miyazawa Kiichi agreed to make annual reform recommendations with President Bill Clinton.
The United States at that time had a policy of giving a boost to U.S. multinationals to fully enter into the world market, and listed Japan at the top of the policy priority. In order to smooth the way to expand trade with Japan, the U.S. side tried to revamp Japanese trade regulations. Then, the Annual Reform Recommendations were born so as to remove so-called structural impediments.
Partnership for Growth
In 1997, PM Hashimoto Ryutaro and President Clinton agreed on “recommendations” based on the Enhanced Initiative on Deregulation and Competition Policy.
In June 2001, PM Koizumi Jun’ichiro and President George W. Bush announced a joint economic program called Partnership for Growth, further facilitating the U.S. intervention policy.
In December 2001, the Council on Foreign Relations, a U.S. governmental think-tank, released “directions” for U.S. economic policy toward Japan, aiming at remaking Japan in the name of globalization. The “directions” recommended that the Japanese market be opened to foreign enterprises, create an investment-friendly environment, ease requirements for M & A, and adopt U.S.-style business management, trade practice, and employment practices.
The “directions” were emphasizing that it will be wise for the U.S. to win over a Japanese group calling for “structural reform” to the U.S. side as a U.S. partner.
By reference to these “directions”, the Bush administration crafted its economic strategy to deal with Japan and urged the Koizumi Cabinet to include recommendations written in the “directions” into Koizumi’s “structural reform” scheme. Koizumi, in response, met almost all the U.S. demands.
The two figures even prepared a system to allow business leaders of both countries to participate in intergovernmental talks. Thus, the U.S. and Japanese governments, the Japan-U.S. financial world, and large corporations came to control the Japanese economy.
>Economy in subordination to US - II: Pressure for postal service privatization
>Economy in subordination to US - III: Destruction of local economiesn
>Economy in subordination to US - IV: TPP, US final demand
